The future of medical self-regulation in the United Kingdom – renegotiating the state–profession bargain? by Davies, Mark
Davies, Mark (2014) The future of medical self-regulation in the United Kingdom – 
Renegotiating the state–profession bargain? Medical Law International, 14 (4). pp. 
236-265. ISSN 0968-5332 
 
Pre-publication version – some errors may remain 
 
THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL SELF- REGULATION IN THE UNITED 








The Law Commission recently published its report, Regulation of Health Care Professionals 
Regulation of Social Care Professionals in England.2 This provides a timely reminder that 
medical regulation remains potentially problematic and contentious. In this article I consider 
the prospective future of medical regulation through the lens of its starting point – a notional 
state-profession bargain – and whether the Law Commission report implicitly proposes a 
significant renegotiation of that bargain over a century and a half after its inception. 
 
A number of sociological considerations of the nature of professions have identified a 
hypothetical bargain, a notional contract, between the state and newly emerging professions 
such as medicine and law. The mid-nineteenth century was a particularly active time in this 
respect. These emerging professions attained significant elements of monopoly power in 
return for agreeing, inter alia, to ensure that practitioners were appropriately trained and 
regulated.3 As Giaimo observes, the state granted functional associations a significant degree 
of autonomy to pursue their collective self-interest and attain public status, in return for 
serving the broader interests of public policy.4 
 
The nineteenth century state therefore saw the important social function of providing medical 
services brought under what was intended to be a clearly defined and robust regulatory 
regime, whilst the medical practitioners received opportunities to earn a good living and 
achieve high social status in a monopoly environment.  
 
It has been recognised that the state-profession bargain should be adapted to changing social 
circumstances.5 The state retains the power to monitor professions, underpinned by the threat 
of intervention if professional bodies fail to rise appropriately to the challenges of effective 
professional control. In principle, the threat of intervention should ensure that professional 
bodies retain sufficiently tight control over their members.6 However, the history of medical 
regulation has conspicuously failed to live up to this expectation in a number of respects.  As 
Irvine observed, even though the privileges delegated by the state have always notionally 
been subject to medical practitioners keeping to their side of the bargain, some have treated 
‘self-regulation as a right to do pretty much as they please, especially in clinical practice.’7 In 
the post-1948 environment of near monopoly National Health Service (NHS) provision the 
implications of this attitude took on greater significance. Since the creation of the NHS, most 
medical practitioners have worked in environments free from genuine market competition. 
Therefore, any threat by the state to withdraw monopoly status from medical practitioners 
lacks credibility unless accompanied by proposals to reform the NHS in a manner which 
removes doctors from their dominant position at its heart.8  
 
In the first part of this article I set the scene by considering briefly the history of the state-
medical profession bargain. This is a topic widely written about in sociological academic 
literature, but may be less familiar to some lawyer readers. I then consider the core elements 
of my arguments – whether revalidation represents a significant renegotiation of the state-
profession bargain and whether the Law Commission proposals, if adopted, would move the 
balance of the bargain even further away from the medical profession. 
 
II. BACKGROUND TO THE CREATION OF THE STATE-MEDICAL PROFESSION 
BARGAIN 
 
Whilst some organization of medical occupations existed prior to the creation of the General 
Medical Council(GMC) in the mid-nineteenth century,9 Irvine identifies the pre-GMC 
environment as consisting of an oversupply of ‘all kinds of “healers”...[competing] 
vigorously for patients, status and legitimacy.’10 'Unqualified' and 'fringe' providers of 
medical services in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries posed an economic threat to those 
who considered themselves to be more orthodox practitioners, and this played an important 
part in the professionalization debate.11  Writing about Georgian England,12 Porter identifies 
the London medical scene as categorized by a ‘three-tiered hierarchy’ consisting of the 
College of Physicians, the Incorporation of Surgeons and the Apothecaries' Company. 
Beneath these tiers lay ‘an enormous range of other groups’ providing medical services – 
‘wise-women, midwives, nurses, Lady Bountifuls, horse-doctors, chemists, grocers, itinerant 
pedlars – a list constituting a perennial penumbra of respectable and tolerated irregular.'13 
 
It has been argued that the more scientifically focused amongst these competing groupings 
led the drive for a more controlled practice environment, to better guarantee a return on their 
educational investment. 14 This corresponded with the development of an eighteen and 
nineteenth century environment which Porter describes as ‘an age of golden opportunity for 
cultivating the business side of medicine.’ 15 A consumer society had emerged in this period 
and brand identity begun to develop.16 In this regard, the moves which led to the formal 
professionalization of medicine and the creation of the GMC may be seen in part as a money 
driven branding exercise. This state and societal establishment position corresponds with the 
history as described by Moran, who categorizes medicine as an ancient profession which 
traditionally focused on the social rather than technical aspects of service provision. Unlike 
some other emergent nineteenth century professions, which were genuinely novel responses 
to the needs of a newly industrialised economy, medicine utilized the market opportunities 
which industrialisation offered. The Medical Act 1858, discussed below, therefore facilitated 
the move towards ‘new markets in medical consumption, and the new technologies of 
medical care, created by industrialism.’17  
 
The outcome of the motivating factors discussed above – whether a cynical branding exercise 
or a more benign move intended to bring order to the relative occupational chaos, or elements 
of both – was the Medical Act 1858, which created the ‘General Council of Medical 
Education and Registration’. 18  The result was the distinguishing of qualified from 
unqualified practitioners by controlling who was permitted to be included in the newly 
created ‘medical register’.19 In terms of the order in which developments occurred, the 1858 
Act is often credited with creating the modern medical profession. However, it has also been 
argued that that the medical profession was a cause, not a result, of the Act – the profession 
having largely created itself and then persuaded the state to recognize this construction. 
Whatever the actual cause-and-effect position, the legislation cemented the relationship 
between the medical profession and the state. 20  
 Whilst there may have been an intended self-serving element to the 1858 Act, its immediate 
practical effect did not meet the expectations of at least some members of the emergent 
profession. Weatherall, for example, cites some contemporary observers as describing the 
legislation as an 'utterly futile and unremunerative' failure. 21 The Act had not outlawed the 
provision of medical services by unregistered practitioners - alternative approaches such as 
‘homoeopathy, mesmerism, spiritualism or botanic medicine’ remained lawful. Furthermore, 
the first medical register of 1860 included, in the view of some practitioners, examples of 
those they considered to be ‘quacks’ – damaging the profitability of orthodox practitioners 
and causing resentment that they had paid for membership of the newly created profession 
yet were not enjoying the expected financial returns.22 This insecurity, it is further suggested, 
accounted for the importance subsequently placed on maintaining supportive relationships 
and ‘quiescence’ within the orthodox profession,23 and collegial governance favoured over a 
hierarchical approach.24  The President of the GMC in 1889 is quoted as expressing concerns 
that the Council should not be overanxious to identify and make public the shortcomings of 
‘our honourable profession’.25 Echoes of this approach remained over a century later, when 
Stacey observed that the GMC retained the image of a ‘gentlemen’s club’, more interested in 
maintain good relations between members than with protecting the public.26  
 
Notwithstanding the shaky start, it has been argued that the 1858 Act was the beginning of a 
century long run during which time the medical profession ‘reached the zenith of its 
independent power and public standing.’27 The position as it developed, particularly in the 
period after the creation of the NHS in the late 1940s, has been described as an ‘implicit 
concordat’ between the state and the medical profession which permitted the latter to treat 
patients in the manner they chose, as long as budgetary restraint determined by the state we 
adhered to. The price of this clinical autonomy was rationing by the medical profession of 
limited state resources, disguising this reality from the public behind the curtain of clinical 
decision making.28 Even from within the medical profession it was acknowledged that the 
profession was complicit in rationing healthcare provision behind the cloak of clinical need. 
At least in the early days of the NHS, this weakened the hand of government.29 Overall, this 
approach saw the state ‘cede enormous powers’ to the medical profession, in particular to 
hospital consultants, who have been described as running their departments ‘like fiefdoms’.30   
 
In such an environment the profession’s interpretation of acceptable behaviour and the 
associated regulatory approach held significant sway. The state largely adopted a hands-off 
approach, with no meaningful consideration of intervening in the medical regulatory system 
until the Merrison Committee in 1972.31  Even that led to little effective change. As Irvine put 
it:  
  
‘The stark reality is that from the beginning in 1858 right up to the early 1990s statutory self-
regulation as operated by the GMC failed the public and conscientious doctors. [The overall 
effect of which was] an alarming lack of a sense of collective responsibility at the level of 
institutional leadership in the profession to make self-regulation work properly for patients.’32  
 
Arguably, the GMC spent too much of its history seeking to maintain the confidence of the 
profession, at some expense of protecting the public.33 On the few occasions in its history 
when the GMC has risen to the challenge of fearlessly regulating in the public interest, a 
notable example being the response, albeit rather late, to the events at the Bristol Royal 
Infirmary, it has been argued that this has be precipitated by expediency, not principle. 34  
 
Whilst the discussion above tends to amalgamate the GMC and medical profession as a 
collective whole, there is some evidence that failures cannot always be attributed to the GMC 
– rather, the profession itself has lacked commitment to supporting the GMC in its role within 
the state-profession bargain.35 For example, in 1975 the British Medical Association and the 
Royal Colleges instituted an Enquiry into doctors' continuing competence to practice.36 It is 
of note that these senior representative professional bodies appear not to have invited the 
GMC to participate, a notable omission given the GMC’s statutory duty to protect the 
public.37 Whether due to the GMC’s absence or otherwise, the Enquiry failed to reach a clear 
conclusion. In light of this, Irvine argues that self-interest proved more tempting to 
representatives of the profession than did any desire to maximise the chances of increasing 
the effectiveness of medical self-regulation. 38  
 
 
III. ARGUMENTS FAVOURING A NEW STATE-MEDICAL PROFESSION 
BARGAIN 
 
As discussed above, the medical profession has far from showered itself with glory with its 
operation of self-regulatory mechanisms since the creation of the General Council of Medical 
Education and Registration in 1858. When faced with external challenges the medical 
profession has proven adept at temporarily setting aside internal rivalries and differences to 
fend these off. 39 This history may be used to argue for the removal of the regulatory 
privileges entirely from the profession and returning these to the state, either directly or 
through the empowerment of a meta-regulator. This would correspond with the rise in recent 
years of meta-regulatory agencies in other professional spheres, accompanied by a 
‘thickening at the centre’ with the role of the executive in monitoring and directing the 
activities of professional and other regulation increasing. 40  However, one of the key 
motivators for the granting of self-regulatory responsibilities to professions – that they are 
best placed to engage with the complexity of professional knowledge and environments - 
remains pertinent. 41 Perhaps even more pertinent than the position a century and a half ago 
when the GMC was first created. Today, the overall societal legal framework is far more 
complex and the scientific and technical complexity of medical practice far greater. The task 
faced by the state to regulate medical practitioners directly would be more challenging than 
ever. 
 
It can be argued that simply recreating the state-profession bargain, moderately modified to 
bring it up to date, would hardly be worth the effort. Rather, if the process is to be worthwhile 
the bargain should seek to ensure a new model of doctor. Financial reward as a key motivator 
has the potential to undermine public faith in a remodelled bargain. For example, recent years 
have witnessed general practitioners collectively negotiating terms with the state which saw 
significant pay increases coupled with reduced working hours and, for many, an opt out from 
out-of-hours care. Subsequent reports suggest that some patients have experienced longer 
waits to see their GP and unsatisfactory out-of-hours provision.42  Similarly, consultants 
seeking to significantly reduce out of hours and weekend working have, it has been argued 
from some quarters, shown little of the compassion traditionally associated with the ideal 
model doctor. For example, it was reported in 2012 that at the British Medical Association’s 
annual consultants’ conference attendees rejected calls to ensure that sufficient numbers of 
senior doctors were available during evenings and at weekends, some complaining that such a 
move equated to them being ‘rostered like their juniors’. The consultants are reported to have 
acknowledged the importance of consultant led care to reducing mortality rates, but rejected 
the motion largely on the basis that pay levels were ‘not enough’. The 2003 consultant 
contract had made weekend work and work after 7pm optional for hospital consultants.43 
Money, it seems, for some in the medical profession may have overridden concerns for 
patient care, despite evidence from both the UK and abroad that patients admitted to hospital 
at weekends were more likely to die than those admitted during the week.44 Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development statistics indicate that UK doctors are amongst the 
most highly paid in the industrialized world, a position further enhanced by the fact that 
within the monopoly environment of the NHS, pay for the vast majority of doctors comes 
from the public purse in an environment with no meaningful market risk. OECD figures also 
indicate comparatively lower spending on modern life saving equipment and a lower ratio of 
doctors per thousand of the population in the UK. Both latter factors potentially exacerbated 
by the proportion of the NHS budget spent on doctors’ wages. The generous pay for UK 
doctors has not prevented the UK being one amongst developed countries with the highest 
rates of avoidable deaths.45 Whilst there is no clear correlation between these various 
statistics, they do support the argument that doctors in the UK have manoeuvred themselves 
into an advantageous financial position, free of market pressures encountered by many other 
professional groups in the UK and some doctors in other industrialized nations, yet this has 
not been accompanied by a particularly impressive comparative picture in terms of the 
overall quality of medical care. The state-profession bargain, it seems, has been and remains 
significantly skewed in favour of the medical profession. 
 
IV. REVALIDATION AS AN EXAMPLE OF RENEGOTIATING THE BARGAIN? 
 
In the last decade or so there have been a few examples of state intervention into the medical 
regulatory process which could be seen as partial renegotiation of the state-profession 
bargain. Enforced changes to remove the power of doctors to elect members of the GMC and 
constitutional changes to ensure a non-medical majority, following recommendations by the 
Shipman Inquiry, are notable examples.46 However, the most significant has related to the 
debate and provisions regarding revalidation and the pressure this has placed on the extent of 
trust between state and profession.47 In this section I consider whether or not renegotiation of 
the bargain is an accurate categorization of these developments. 
  
Discussion of revalidation can be dated back a number of decades48 but serious consideration 
arose when the GMC was empowered to introduce revalidation from 2002.49 The core idea 
behind revalidation is that doctors would no longer normally be registered for life. This 
represents a move away from the  traditional approach by the GMC - described as being to 
‘drum convicted sinners out of the profession, not to ensure continued professional virtue’.50 
Irvine argued that the GMC recognised that at the time politicians ‘were ready to pick a fight 
with the medical profession’ after the Bristol and other scandals and that the GMC needed to 
be seen to be proactive.51 
 
The underpinning principle of revalidation is that by having to establish their fitness to 
practise on a periodic basis, members of the medical profession would work harder to retain 
the privileges of their professional status. The desired result would be an increase in the 
quality of medical care and better protection for the public against rogue or otherwise unfit 
practitioners.52  
 
From this perspective, ‘revalidation should be a new beginning [which allows] the medical 
profession to review its culture...’53 and represented the change from ‘management by 
exception’, which had been the position since the GMC’s inception, by ensuring that all 
practitioners would periodically be confirmed as fit to practise.54 One early issue with this 
view of revalidation is that the GMC were simultaneously facing in two potentially 
contradictory directions. On the one hand they sought to emphasise to government and the 
public that revalidation was a response to past crises, to minimise the risk of any likely 
repetition of the various scandals which had emerged from within medical practice. By 
requiring individual practitioners to account for their continued suitability, the Medical 
Register would once again satisfy its intended purpose – to ensure that the public can have 
confidence that all doctors are competent, adhere to high ethical standards and can be trusted 
with their patients’ lives and wellbeing.55 On the other hand, the GMC was careful to reassure 
doctors that revalidation would be light-touch and that individual practitioners should have 
nothing to fear. For this audience, the focus was on doctors being encouraged to see 
revalidation as a positive opportunity for them to reflect on their practice.56 Such reassurances 
appear not to have been wholly persuasive – with significant opposition coming from those 
members of the GMC elected by the profession, from representatives on the BMA Council,57 
as well as from individual practitioners.58 It is telling that some commentators from within 
the profession were critical of revalidation in principle without, apparently, acknowledging 
just how shocking the events at Bristol, the activities of Harold Shipman and certain other 
cases were and their potential effect of undermining trust in the medical profession. For 
example, as van Zwanenberg states: 
 
‘In just over a decade, the NHS has moved from being an organisation based on high trust 
relationships to one where explicit written down standards, which are monitored, have 
become the norm for individuals and institutions. Revalidation is part of this increased 
bureaucratic control being applied to professional self regulation. It may increase apparent 
accountability, but may not foster a culture which increases patients' trust and doctors' 
professionalism.’ 59 
 From 2000 to 2003 the first set of proposals from the GMC would have created a revalidation 
process which was described by the Shipman Inquiry as ‘manifestly designed to protect 
patients.’ 60 It would have required all registered doctors to produce a detailed revalidation 
folder – including information about critical incidents and patient complaints.61 These folders 
would have formed the basis of five-yearly revalidation process by a ‘revalidation group’, 
reporting to the GMC.62 This folder based approach was not free from flaws – for example it 
was unclear what, if any, security mechanisms would have been put in place to ensure that 
doctors moving between employers did not remove unfavourable information. It was also 
questionable whether the resources to be made available for revalidation would have been 
sufficient to ensure that sufficient revalidation group members were recruited and trained to 
allow enough time to be spent scrutinising each folder.63 Standards against which doctors 
were to be measured were also relatively ambiguous – an approach fostered during the 
bargaining process by those seeking to protect professional interests. Notwithstanding such 
criticisms, this initial model for revalidation remains the most comprehensive of the variants 
mooted. Subsequently, the GMC retreated from this model, influenced in part, it was argued, 
by powerful opposing medical interest groups,64 and in so doing ‘lost sight of their 
aspirational proposals’.65 The model of revalidation moved towards significant reliance on 
existing employment related appraisal processes, with the idea of revalidation panels being 
abandoned and most aspects of revalidation delegated to local procedures.66 No retesting of 
knowledge or practical skills was included. 67  Appraisal, generally viewed as a formative 
process, was to double up as a process for determining continued fitness to practise - a 
supposed system of protection which offered little  enhancement to pre-existing systems.68 
Following the Fifth Report of the Shipman Inquiry, which disapproved strongly of the 
watered down proposals, the GMC plans were suspended by the Secretary of State for Health 
in 2005 and the Chief Medical Officer instructed to undertake a review of the proposals for 
revalidation. 
It has been argued that until the criticism by the Shipman Inquiry repoliticised the issue, the 
development of a revalidation policy had represented a re-establishing, especially by the 
British Medical Association, of historic power and close ties with the government. The result 
of which was a move away by government from the explicitly critical approach of the 1990s, 
towards acceptance of the policies proposed by the profession ‘in exchange for a quid pro 
quo in the negotiation of the employment contract.’ 69  
 
The model of revalidation which was developed subsequent to 2005 retains significant 
elements of the weaknesses about which the Shipman Inquiry was critical. The power of the 
medical profession and its beneficial relationship with government may be seen to have at 
least partially won the day. The General Medical Council (Licence to Practise and 
Revalidation) Regulations 2012 were made by the GMC and agreed by the Department of 
Health and Privy Council, resulting in revalidation finally being implemented on 3 December 
2012, with the GMC expecting the majority of licensed doctors to have undergone 
revalidation for the first time by March 2016. The model of revalidation adopted is based 
around workplace appraisals and associated clinical governance mechanisms.70 Revalidation 
will occur in five yearly cycles based around the decision whether or not to renew a doctor’s 
license to practise.71  The GMC explicitly state that revalidation is complementary to existing 
workplace systems ‘for achieving high quality care’.72 Employing organisations are required 
to appoint a senior doctor trained as a ‘responsible officer’ to oversee the systems for 
governance and appraisal and advising the GMC about each doctor’s fitness to practise.73 As 
part of appraisal, doctors are expected to collect and be prepared to discuss six types of 
supporting information: continuing professional development; quality improvement activity; 
significant events; feedback from colleagues; feedback from patients; complaints and 
compliments. The GMC states that these must be discussed ‘at least once in each five year 
cycle’.74  
This appears to be revalidation process which lacks robustness. For example, the six types of 
supporting information noted above equates on average to little more than one area to be 
covered each year. In terms of feedback from patients, colleagues and others, the GMC 
recommends that doctors think broadly about who might give the most useful feedback. For 
example, not just patients but carers and family members and even medical students. In terms 
of feedback content the GMC has produced standard questionnaires. However, despite this 
reasonably encouraging rhetoric, the GMC appears to have no clear and compulsory 
mechanism to ensure that negative responses are not disposed of or that doctors follow the 
GMC’s recommendations to seek to use feedback opportunities creatively. The GMC states 
that it would ‘expect’ that any questionnaire will be administered independently of the doctor 
and the appraiser’. However, ‘expect’ is not the most compelling term which could have been 
chosen and there appears to an absence of a clear statement of consequences, if any, if this 
expectation is not met. In terms of frequency and sample size, the GMC states at least once 
every five years but does not prescribe a minimum sample size. Once every five years and 
what could be a very small response sample risks accusations that this approach lacks 
robustness in light of the GMC stating that ‘patient feedback should be at the heart of 
doctors’ professional development.’75 As Thomas argued in 2005, Harold Shipman could 
have satisfied revalidation requirements unless the process required someone to be ‘unafraid 
to ask “why do so many of your patients die?” … Revalidation must lead to an environment 
where supportive asking of uncomfortable questions becomes the norm.’76 The latter appears 
not to have been achieved by the model finally adopted by the GMC. It has been observed 
that mechanisms within clinical governance processes for addressing poor individual 
performance lack clarity and that responsibility for poor performance could involve complex 
interactions between different clinicians and also managers. It has also been argued that 
organisational responses to clinical governance policies may ultimately come to rely upon 
traditional medical hierarchies and their technical medical expertise. 77 So, the revalidation 
process is built upon foundations which may themselves be unfit for this purpose and which 
default to hierarchical self-regulatory processes which have failed in a number of key 
instances.  Early stage research into the perception various stakeholders have about 
revalidation indicates that it is viewed as a ‘depersonalised’, ‘complex’ and ‘abstracted’ 
process.78 As such, it may continue to be viewed as alien and unwelcome by members of the 
profession, whilst simultaneously failing to represent a particularly positive change to the 
state-profession bargain for the public.  
 
Perhaps with issues such as these in mind, in 2014 the GMC tendered for a three year ‘wide-
scale evaluation’ of revalidation. There is a risk that consideration of revalidation will revert 
to a cycle of re-evaluation, possible more robust mechanisms being proposed and parts, at 
least, of the medical profession seeking to weaken such proposals on grounds such as un-
workability, and detraction from the time clinicians have to devote to patients and other 
aspects of service delivery. Devising a robust and effective model for revalidation also faces 
the perennial challenge that modern medical practice and the organisation of the NHS 
encompasses a mass of different specialisms, and some clinicians also working in managerial 
or educational roles.   
 
In terms of alternative models for revalidation, some lessons may be learned from the 
education world. One model which has the potential to be more extensive and robust could 
involve close, independent inspection of professional practice and associated documentation 
– perhaps modelled on Ofsted79 lines but adapted to focus on individual practitioners. Patient 
and other interested party survey input could be modelled on a variation of the National 
Student Survey, again adapted to focus on individual practitioners. Such changes could be 
coupled with the periodic retesting of knowledge.  
 
Such an approach, adopted as part of a renegotiated profession-state bargain, would be more 
expensive than the current model of revalidation but would also be more intrusive for 
individual members of the profession than the current compromise model. Evidence of 
professional resistance to less robust models of revalidation indicates that many medical 
practitioners and their representative organisations would not accept such changes willingly.   
 
V. IS A SIGNIFICANTLY RENEWED STATE-PROFESSION BARGAIN A 
PRACTICAL PROPOSITION? LESSONS FROM THE LAW COMMISSION 
REPORT 
 
If revalidation in its current form is viewed as largely a failed attempt by the state to 
rebalance the state-profession bargain, the question arises whether such rebalancing can ever 
be a practical proposition. A timely starting point with regard to future prospects is the 2014 
Law Commission report, Regulation of Health Care Professionals Regulation of Social Care 
Professionals in England. This followed on from the 2011 Department of Health 
commissioned policy paper, Enabling Excellence: Autonomy and Accountability for Health 
and Social Care Staff,80 in which the government had asked the Law Commission to 
undertake a simplification review of the existing legislative framework and to develop a draft 
Bill for consultation. 81 
 The Law Commission recognised the points discussed in the introductory observations above, 
that much has changed since the creation of the GMC and that there now existed a 
complicated landscape governing complaints about health and social care professionals: 
 
‘As well as regulators’ fitness to practise procedures, there are locally managed systems such 
as employment disciplinary processes, the NHS and social care complaints procedures, and 
the Performers List system. National regulators such as the Care Quality Commission and 
Health Service Ombudsman handle individual complaints, as well as publishing reports and 
good practice guides...’ 82 
 
The Law Commission’s overarching recommendation is that there should be a single statute 
providing a framework for all healthcare regulatory bodies. This would be aimed at 
consolidating and simplifying the position, provide the opportunity to enhance regulator 
powers, enhance regulatory efficiency and introduce co-working between regulators.83 This 
represents a potentially radical departure from the position in 1858 when the medical 
profession which came to be regulated by the GMC was the only one in meaningful terms 
and, as other healthcare occupations emerged, for the subsequent century and a half it 
remained at the top of a hierarchical pyramid. The Law Commission’s proposed new legal 
framework would aim to impose consistency across all medical regulators to the extent 
needed to guarantee ‘the same core functions, minimum procedural requirements and certain 
key public interest provisions.’84 
 
In terms of what it meant by all medical regulators, the Law Commission identified almost 
1.5 million health and social care professionals, spanning 32 professional and occupational 
groups variously governed by nine regulatory bodies.85 Overseeing and supervising the nine 
separate regulators is the Professional Standards Authority.86 As well as its oversight 
function, the Professional Standards Authority is also tasked with sharing good practice and 
advising the governments of the constituent parts of the UK.87 
 
Across the nine regulators, the focus of regulation remains on individual practitioners, rather 
than being institutional or systems based, and the intended overarching aim is to ensure 
public safety by setting appropriate entry standards and by controlling in practice or, where 
necessary, removing from practice those deemed no longer to be fit to practise.88 The reality 
identified by the Law Commission, however, is that of a fragmented, inconsistent and poorly 
understood legal framework, having grown in a piecemeal manner, through various statutes, 
Orders in Council89 and other regulatory mechanisms, since the initial creation of the GMC. 
The result is a wide range of legal provisions which are ‘neither systematic nor coherent’ and 
include ‘a wide range of inconsistencies and idiosyncrasies.’90 This is unsurprising given the 
century and a half of political engagement with healthcare, including the creation of the 
National Health Service. The focus of this article on the renegotiation of the state-
professional bargain through the lens of the Law Commission proposals presents an 
opportunity to address the inconsistencies in an attempt to reformulate the bargain to meet 
early 21st century needs and beyond.  
 
As previously noted, the Law Commission’s proposed new legislative framework is intended 
to impose consistency across regulators with regard to core functions, key public interest 
provisions and minimum procedural requirements.  Operational matters would remain under 
the control of each individual regulator, with flexibility in how they set standards for 
members of their profession.91 Constitutional matters would be subject to Government 
oversight, with the power to impose a single constitution on more than one regulator, if this 
would better achieve consistency. The Law Commission specifically recommended a 
statutory provision that members of the regulated profession could not constitute a majority 
membership of their regulatory body – a position already in place with the GMC, but not with 
all other healthcare regulators.92   
 
The Law Commission also considered streamlining the rule making powers of regulators by 
removing the need for Parliamentary or Privy Council approval, although such a move should 
be considered in light of the loss of opportunities for expert input from Government lawyers 
and specialists at the Department of Health. The Commission ultimately recommended that 
‘regulators should be given powers to make legal rules which are not subject to approval by 
Government or any Parliamentary procedure’ but with oversight by the Professional 
Standards Authority.93 The Government should also be directly empowered to intervene in 
the event of a regulator failing to meet its obligations, subject to the requirement to consult 
the Professional Standards Authority.94  
 
To ensure compliance with the Equality Act 2010 and other rights provisions, the Law 
Commission considered that there should no longer be general requirements of good health 
and good character on the part of registered practitioners. Continued registration should be 
dependent only on fitness to practise and so any health or character requirements must only 
relate to such fitness.95 This provision is not as clearly explained as it might have been. 
Adopting the Law Commission’s reference to rights provisions, there is scope for continuing 
debate about whether a license to practise medicine is, or should be, a ‘privilege’ which can 
be withheld or withdrawn in light of any information which suggests that an individual might 
not be a suitable person in which a hypothetical member of the public would feel comfortable 
putting trust over their bodily integrity and physical, mental and emotional well-being, or 
whether it is a ‘right’ possessed by a doctor and which has to be removed rather than 
withdrawn. In many, perhaps most, instances the practical distinction between the two 
approaches may be indistinguishable, but in some it may not. For example, in R v Misra and 
another96 the defendants, Amit Misra and Rajeev Srivastava were senior house officers 
convicted of manslaughter of a patient. Each was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, 
suspended for two years. When the GMC considered the behaviour of doctors Misra and 
Srivastava, it concluded that in neither case was the behaviour of such magnitude that erasure 
of their names from the medical register was warranted. Following one possible interpretation 
of the Law Commission’s position, if a conviction for manslaughter is insufficient to result in 
a doctor’s permanent removal from practice, how should this be applied to, for example, 
applicants for admission? Will all forms of manslaughter fall into the same category, or is 
leniency specific to gross negligence manslaughter? Clearly such examples will be unusual 
and are unlikely to be central to the Law Commission focus – presumably this focus is that 
any generalised or stereotypical attitudes regarding disability or character should not 
thoughtlessly be applied to questions of whether someone should remain in their healthcare 
profession. However, the fact that examples of the type discussed can relatively readily be 
found97 does reinforce the need for greater explanation on the part of the Law Commission as 
to what exactly its recommendation means. Similarly, greater clarity would be helpful in 
terms of the interaction of the above recommendation and the Commission’s later point that 
certain criminal convictions should result in automatic removal of a registrant from 
practice.98 
 
The Law Commission also recommended that all medical regulators should have the power 
to set standards for continuing training and professional developments. Subject to ensuring 
compatibility with EU requirements, regulators would also be empowered to remove from 
their registers registrants who fail to demonstrate compliance. With regard to revalidation as, 
inter alia, a mechanism for monitoring standards some respondents to the Law Commission 
consultation exercise expressed concerns that revalidation was disproportionately 
burdensome, expensive and lacking cost-benefit analysis evidence sufficient to support it as 
being necessary. The Commission, however, concluded that the introduction or authorisation 
of systems of revalidation should be considered across the range of health regulatory 
professions.99  
 
In terms of other future developments for addressing impaired fitness to practise, the Law 
Commission identified three main options for reform. The first two would see the existing 
legal framework retained, with consolidation and rationalisation across the different medical 
regulators. The second of these would draw more from the recommendations of the Shipman 
Inquiry in terms of the detail of investigation and adjudication. 100  Some respondents to the 
Law Commission consultation expressed concerns that the Shipman Inquiry proposal may be 
complex, unduly legalistic and inflexible, with associated risks of delay and added expense. 
Other concerns focussed upon the fact that impairment might be founded on the basis of 
future risk alone, rather than on past misconduct. Also, personal mitigation would become 
irrelevant. These and other considerations led to the Commission discounting this option.101 
The final option is more radical, departing from the current approach and replacing it with a 
simplified test of impaired fitness to practise focussed on public protection. Any evidence 
which had relevance to public safety could be considered, without a panel having to be 
satisfied that an allegation fitted a pre-defined statutory ground. Some respondents to the Law 
Commission consultation argued that this latter option gave the impression of a ‘scattergun 
approach’ which might draw more registrants into the disciplinary arena. It may also result in 
opaqueness of decision making if regulatory panels continued to adopt grounds similar to the 
former statutory ones, but informally and without this being clearly articulated,102 although 
the latter could make the regulatory panel vulnerable to judicial review.  
 
Taking into consideration the range of consultation responses, and the reasoning that the current 
system is long established and well supported by a body of case law, the Law Commission concluded 
that there would need to be a compelling case for significant change. Retention of the current 
approach was therefore favoured.103 It is a pity that the Law Commission adopted a rather 
conservative conclusion with regard to the future of determining impaired fitness to practise. 
Whilst the body of case law reasoning cannot be disputed, English common law provides 
numerous examples of previously well established bodies of precedent being departed from, 
if societal and legal process necessitates this. In particular, the carefully reasoned approach 
from the Shipman Inquiry is rather quickly dismissed by the Law Commission. The test 
proposed, which included, inter alia, consideration of whether the practitioner is a risk to 
patients; has brought the profession into disrepute; has breached one of the fundamental 
tenets of the profession, or; that his or her integrity cannot be relied upon are potentially 
draconian but the nature of the misconduct investigated by the Shipman and certain other 
inquiries had demonstrated that a more forgiving approach could be extremely harmful to 
patients. The future risk element was also potentially harsh but also important – the 
magnitude of the behaviour investigated by the Shipman Inquiry left no room for 
compromise in terms of acceptability of simply waiting to see what might happen. The 
proposed test of whether a ‘reasonable and well-informed person would consider, in the light 
of what is known about the allegation and about the doctor’s past and present circumstances, 
that there is a real risk’ that he or she might act in a particular way was necessary to address 
future risk. Concerns by consultation respondents may, therefore, have been pertinent but not 
necessarily well-founded in terms of public protection. 
 Historically, the investigatory capacity of the GMC and its willingness to investigate has been 
woefully inadequate, resulting in a failure to detect in a timely manner, if at all, very serious 
misconduct.104 The Law Commission identified failings in the legislative structure regarding 
what may or may not constitute an investigable allegation and reinforced earlier findings that 
the regulatory approach has essentially been and largely remains ‘a passive and reactive one’. 
The Commission proposed statutory provisions which would enable the regulators to more 
effectively classify information which comes to their attention as a potential allegation to be 
investigated. This, the Commission said, would better allow regulators to deal with 
anonymous reports or information which arises from media investigations. The Commission 
recorded some respondents to their consultation exercise as noting that some health regulators 
already acted in this manner, whilst some other consultees expressed concern, albeit not 
supported with evidence, that regulators may be ‘overzealous’ and ‘disproportionate’ when 
digging into matters which come to their attention if investigatory provisions were 
broadened.105 In this latter regard, the Law Commission proposals remain modest. For 
example, a number previous instances of serious misconduct, which were committed over 
lengthy periods, went undetected by the GMC not because the Council was taking an unduly 
prescriptive stance when considering the types of allegation it was permitted to investigate 
but, more fundamentally, it lacked any meaningful policing and investigatory capacity and 
many of its resources ‘on the ground’, i.e. all other doctors who should have been fulfilling 
their role as participants in ‘self’-regulation, failed conspicuously because of an 
unwillingness to report colleagues.106 
 
In terms of screening matters for potential onward referral, the Law Commission favoured 
significant regulator discretion.107 As noted above, certain criminal matters would result in 
automatic removal of a registrant.108 The Professional Standards Authority would retain the 
power to refer fitness to practise decisions to the higher courts if public protection 
requirements have not been met. The Commission also recommended that this referral power 
should be extended to include matters which had been disposed of by consent.109 The latter 
should address an issue which has dogged the regulation of doctors, permitting some who 
have misbehaved to escape public scrutiny by being permitted to have their names voluntarily 
erased from the medical register.110 The Law Commission also recommended that the 
Authority’s powers should be extended to oversee the economic and business performance of 
the regulators, with government ensuring that sufficient resources are available for the 
Authority’s extended role as well as existing roles.111 
 
Separating investigation and adjudication 
 
Historically, medical regulators such as the GMC have undertaken both the investigation and 
adjudication stages of regulation – an approach which has been subject to criticism.112 In the 
late 2000s the Labour government legislated to separate these functions, with the creation of 
the Office of the Health Professions Adjudicator.113 This followed a 2007 Government White 
Paper, Trust, Assurance and Safety – The Regulation of Health Professionals in the 21st 
Century.114 As part of the subsequent coalition government’s cost-saving measures, the 
Office of the Health Professions Adjudicator was abolished in favour of what was perceived 
to be the more cost-effective approach of regulators retaining the adjudicatory function, but 
building in further safeguards.115 In response, the GMC established the Medical Practitioners 
Tribunal Service (MPTS), which remained connected to and funded by the GMC, but 
operationally separate, with a requirement to report annually to Parliament. Parliament 
approved the establishment of the MPTS in 2011 and it was launched in June 2012. The Law 
Commission supported the idea of separate adjudication as a means of underpinning 
confidence in the regulatory process, with the favoured option being the transfer of the 
function to HM Courts and Tribunals Service. The option was not, however, thought to be 
politically palatable, at least in the short-to-medium term, and so the Commission declined to 
include any specific mechanism in the draft Bill, leaving it to Parliament to decide whether or 
not to consider the matter further. Pending this, the Commission recommended that the 
Professional Standards Authority oversee moves by regulators towards further separating 
investigation and adjudication along the lines of the GMC’s Medical Practitioners Tribunal 
Service.116 Time will tell how effective the MPTS will be compared with its predecessors, but 
in the transition from the previous GMC fitness to practice panel model a number of the 
former panel members are now with the MPTS. At the time of writing in August 2014, 108 
panel members we identified by the MPTS as having been appointed in 2010 or earlier, with 
a number of these significantly earlier than this. This number represents over a third of total 
panel members. Many of these members will have gained significant experience under the 
previous adjudicatory model. With areas of complex adjudication, such as that relating to 
medical regulation, the desire for an element of continuity of expertise and experience is 
perhaps inevitable, but such continuity may also significantly slow any attempts to change 
cultural attitudes within the organisation. 
 
Unlike some other professions, for example barristers and solicitors, the regulation of 
healthcare professionals has generally not included a consumer complaints element. 
Complaints which don’t raise fitness to practise issues have remained within the remit of a 
healthcare professional’s employer.117 The conclusion of the Law Commission was that 
healthcare regulators having the power to run their own complaints services was undesirable, 
as it might result in conflicts of interest between regulation and complaints handling, as well 
as diverting or watering down the use of available resources. This latter point was, however, 
not decisive and the regulators should be empowered to fund a consumer complaints service, 
to be run independently. Such power would only be useable with the approval of the 
Professional Standards Authority – which would be required to confirm that funding such a 
service would enhance ‘the main duty to protect and promote the health, safety and well-
being of the public and maintain public confidence in the profession’.118  This cautious 
approach on the part of the Law Commission creates potential tensions with other influential 
commentary  - such as the Francis Report into the failings at the Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust. The Francis Report identifies complaints and how they are handled as 
providing valuable insights into effectiveness of maintaining  standards, and therefore as a 
source of accountability.119 With regard to this point, lessons may be learned from the 
complaints system operated by, and ultimately imposed upon, lawyers in England and Wales 
over the past two to three decades.120 After significant and sustained criticism of the systems 
operated by the professions themselves, especially the solicitors’ profession, the process was 
removed from their control by means of the Legal Services Act 2007 and placed in the hands 
of the Legal Services Board and, from there, the Legal Ombudsman and the Office for Legal 
Complaints. Complainants about legal services now have a one-stop shop, irrespective of the 
type of lawyer being complained about.121 By insisting upon independence of healthcare 
consumer complaints services the Law Commission may have had a similar model in mind, 
but the discretionary nature of whether and, to some extent, how each professional regulator 
approaches the issue of future complaints resolution poses the risk that many of the problems 




The original state-medical profession bargain in the mid-nineteenth century arose at a time 
when scientific medicine was in its infancy and before the creation of organised state 
provision of medical care. In this environment there was little for either side to lose, but 
potentially much to gain from the bargain. Over a century and a half later, scientific high-
technology medicine, largely provided free at the point of use by the state under the auspices 
of the NHS, is now the norm in the UK. In this environment doctors are integrated and have a 
power base within this model. As a result, attempts to govern the state-medical profession 
relationship have lacked teeth, in large part because the dependence by the state on the 
medical profession in the attempt to meet the healthcare needs of the population result in 
weak bargaining powers on the part of the state.122  The nature of health provision in the UK 
inevitably means that smaller (although not necessarily small in absolute terms) scale 
bargaining with segments of the medical profession is a relatively regular feature. For 
example, in the early 2000s consultants in England and Wales rejected a proposed contract 
which would have transferred significant powers to managers, at the expense of clinical 
autonomy. The eventual agreement with the state did not include the power transfer and 
included an improved pay package for consultants.123 What occurs far less frequently is the 
wholesale reconsideration of the position profession wide. As discussed, revalidation is the 
only significant example of this in recent years. Whilst the need for a robust revalidation 
process for doctors has been advocated from a variety of quarters and the state has 
acknowledged its importance, the reality remains that a significant failure rate amongst 
doctors seeking revalidation, or a widespread refusal to cooperate if doctors viewed the 
process as being unduly onerous, would quickly bring the NHS to a point of crisis. When 
such non-cooperation by doctors was in prospect in different circumstances over 40 years ago 
- when the GMC sought more money from each doctor by way of an annual fee for retention 
of their name on the medical register, removal from the register being the penalty for non-
compliance - the government stepped in before any significant crisis could ensue.124 In 
essence, the profession demonstrated that if doctors and their representatives objected 
strongly enough to a particular proposal or development they could wield very significant 
power. Reflecting such previous encounters, the medical profession was able to fend-off all 
but a significantly watered down revalidation process, which involves  little more than pre-
existing employment based appraisal mechanisms.   
 
The prospective bargaining parties are also now numerous and complex. As well as the GMC 
as regulator and the British Medical Association, as trades union, the Medical Royal Colleges 
have responsibilities for various specialities and other specialist associations have also 
developed. The various organisations speaking on behalf of all or elements of the medical 
profession are first and foremost premised on notions of professional autonomy. 125 As has 
been seen with the collective efforts to shape models of revalidation, forceful voices emerge 
from within these professional organisations.  
 
Viewed from the perspective of significant renegotiation of the state-medical profession 
bargain, the lengthy review, consultation exercise and proposals by the Law Commission 
offered a rare opportunity. At first sight, the Law Commission proposals appear to offer little 
more than a tidying up and rationalisation exercise. However, when considered in greater 
detail the proposals do potentially contain more radical depths. The first of these is the central 
premise that the regulation of doctors should be further subsumed within a larger regulatory 
framework which encompasses all other major healthcare occupations and professions and, 
presumably, would also encompass additional professional groupings which emerge in the 
future. A number, perhaps all, other healthcare occupations would, historically, have been 
viewed as of significantly lower status than doctors. Whilst the Commission proposals stop 
short of full integration and leave each profession with its own regulator, the proposals do 
point in the direction of further future integration. Of all of the healthcare professions brought 
under the Law Commission’s proposed regulatory umbrella, doctors potentially have the 
most to lose from these moves if they threaten the distinct, powerful status they have so far 
enjoyed. Such developments in the training and regulatory framework also present the 
prospect of the merging of healthcare roles such that work traditionally restricted to doctors is 
shared with, or even overridden by, other healthcare professions. The development, for 
example, of physician associates as healthcare professionals who may be viewed as sitting 
somewhere between nurses and fully qualified doctors represents a further muddying of the 
waters. Instructive comparisons can be made with the relationship between solicitors and 
legal executives. Originally Solicitor’s Clerks in the 19th century, developing into Solicitors 
Managing Clerks, with their own Association by the late 1920s, and by the 1960s being 
reinvented as the Institute of Legal Executives. Legal executives largely remained as 
assistants to solicitors until relatively recently, but have since acquired extended rights of 
audience in the courts, are permitted to apply for judicial appointment, have the capacity to 
practice independently of solicitors or to acquire partnership equivalent status in solicitors 
firms. In 2012 the Institute of Legal Executives was granted a Royal Charter, bringing it more 
clearly in line with the Law Society and the Bar Council as a fully fledged branch of the legal 
profession. Physician associates may currently be categorized as assistants to doctors, 126 but 
career development and lobbying on their part may see them developing into a threat to 
traditional medical hierarchies. 
 
Further comparisons can be drawn with lawyers. The shake-up of the legal services market 
by the Legal Services Act 2007 presents the prospect of the traditional high status 
professional roles of barrister and solicitor being overridden by new models of lawyer and 
legal services provider, more narrowly trained but potentially cheaper than their traditional 
counterparts. As Susskind has argued, in the future, whilst some work will remain for what he 
calls ‘the expert trusted adviser’ undertaking complex, high value tasks in a personalized 
manner and underpinned by strict principles of confidentiality and other elements of legal 
ethics, other legal tasks may be automated, commoditized and undertaken or overseen by 
workers with far lower levels of legal training than is commonly associated with practising 
lawyers today.127 Such a model could see the end of differentiated professional training 
leading to different designated roles, to be replaced by a single training model which would 
allow students to step off at a point sufficient to meet their career aspirations (and to step 
back on at a later date if further progression along the professional qualification spectrum is 
desired). The 2007 Act also weakened the regulatory bodies of existing legal professions by 
removing from them control over complaints handling and placing their remaining regulatory 
functions under the jurisdiction of a meta-regulator, the Legal Services Board.  
 
The Law Commission proposals could represent the beginning of similar intermingling and 
associated weakening of traditional professional positioning within the medical field. As with 
Susskind’s ‘expert trusted advisers’, the most complex aspects of medical practise will 
continue to require very highly trained individuals, but some other areas of medicine 
traditionally undertaken by doctors could increasingly be undertaken by other healthcare 
providers, perhaps supported by accompanying enhanced use of technology.128  Bringing 
more closely together the currently distinct qualification and regulatory models applied to 
different healthcare professions could turn out to be a first step towards significantly greater 
unification. The prospect of the fragmentation or significant realignment of medical 
hierarchies may be further exacerbated as the traditional medical profession has increasingly 
become divided. Described in one study as 'networks at war', the profession may increasingly 
struggle to unite even though it is in its collective interest to do so. 129 Viewed from this 
perspective, considerations of renegotiating the state-doctor bargain may be misplaced. It 
may be far less a renegotiation and far more the state stealthily retrieving and redistributing 
previously gifted powers and privileges.  
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